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Economically Targeted Investments, 
IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of 
Industrial Policy 
Edward A. Zelinskyt 
In Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 (IB 94-1), the Department of Labor de-
fines economically targeted investments (ETis) as investments which bear 
risk-adjusted, market rates of return and which also generate collateral 
economic benefits. IB 94-1 declares ETis, so defined, to be consistent with 
the fiduciary provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA). In his critique of IB 94-1, Professor Edward Zelinsky finds 
the ETI concept unsound as a matter of policy and logic and incompatible 
with ERISA 's statutory standards governing pension trustees' investment 
decisions. Professor Zelinsky views IB 94-1 as resurrecting the discredited 
notion of industrial policy. He concludes that the DOL should withdraw IB 
94-1 or that Congress should repeal it. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 22, .1994, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued Interpretive 
Bulletin 94-1 (1B 94-1)1, the Department's much anticipated statement on 
the propriety of pension2 plans undertaking "economically targeted invest-
ments" (ETis). Approximately two weeks earlier, the DOL had formally 
requested proposals for "a clearinghouse to collect and distribute informa-
tion on" ETis.3 The DOL portrays IB 94-1 as simply a routine declaration 
of existing law and the ETI clearinghouse as merely a device to facilitate 
communications in the pension industry. 
A review of IB 94-1 and of the proposal for an ETI clearinghouse 
leads me to quite different conclusions. The ETI concept, as expounded by 
the DOL, is unsound as a: matter of logic and policy and is incompatible 
with the statutory standards governing the investment decisions of pension 
fiduciaries. Moreover, the ETI concept, advertised by the DOL as a routine 
confirmation of existing law, reflects a more fundamental and unwise 
agenda: IB 94-1 and the ETI clearinghouse represent troubling steps in the 
reincarnation of the discredited theory of industrial policy. 
The first section of this article discusses the DOL's definition of an 
ETI. The next section indicates how IB 94-1 makes the law of pension 
investments less coherent, less logical and less consonant with the relevant 
l. 59 Fed. Reg. 32,606 (1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 2509.94-1). The DOL unveiled 1B 
94-1 at a hearing before the Joint Economic Committee on the day before the formal issuance of IB 94-
1. See John Godfrey, Prudent Pension Trustees May Use Social Goals To Pick Investments, Reich Says, 
63 TAX NoTEs 1745 (June 27, 1994); Patricia A. Limbacher, Funds Get ET/ Go-ahead, 22 PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS No. 13, 2 (June 27, 1994). It is paradoxical that the DOL characterizes 1B 94-1 as a 
routine declaration of existing law but elected to showcase IB 94-1 before a special congressional hear-
ing. Not surprisingly, the testimony presented at this hearing was heavily weighted in support of 1B 94-
1. For the statement of an ETI opponent at this hearing, see testimony of William A. Niskanen, Lexis/ 
fedtax/TNT/94 tnt 121-34. 
2. The DOL pronouncement on ETis applies, not merely to pension plans, but to all ERISA-
regulated plans, including profit sharing, welfare and 40l(k) arrangements. For ease of exposition, I use 
the term "pension plans" to encompass all of these arrangements. 
3. Lexis/fedtax/TNT/94 tnt 115-37. In the fall of 1994, the DOL awarded the contract to imple-
ment the ETI clearinghouse. See Meegan M. Reilly, Approved Bill Permits Ex-Participants to Sue 
Former Fiduciaries Regarding Purchase of Annuities, 65 TAX NoTEs 347, 348 (October 17, 1994). In 
December, 1994, the DOL submitted a public information collection request to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (0MB), seeking permission to gather information for the clearinghouse about plans' 
ETls. See U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Request for 0MB 
Review and Supporting Statement (December, 1994). See also Patricia B. Limbacher, ET/ Information 
Key to Success of Project, PENs10Ns & INVESTMENTS, April 17, 1995, at 25 (discussing the DOL's 
efforts to gather information on investment history from pension funds as the basis for the clearing-
house's database). 
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statutory standards. The third section of this article explores the current and 
potential harms stemming from IB 94-1, including its resurrection of the 
industrial policy program. I close by concluding that the DOL should with-
draw IB 94-1 or that Congress should repeal it.4 
II 
ETis DEFINED 
IB 94-1 5 defines ETls as "investments selected for the economic bene-
fits they create apart from their investment return to the employee benefit 
plan." In its proposal for an ETI clearinghouse, the DOL lists as typical 
ETI collateral benefits "new jobs, affordable housing (and) infrastructure 
projects." In the preamble to IB 94-1, the DOL identifies "real estate, ven-
ture capital and small business investments" as exemplars of potential ETis. 
An ETI, the DOL indicates, must generate a competitive return consid-
ering the investment's degree of risk. If an investment yields a market rate 
of return, controlling for risk, pension fiduciaries may then consider the 
investment's collateral economic benefits in deciding whether to make the 
investment.. This conclusion, the DOL states, merely declares existing law 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).6 
Indeed, the DOL has made IB 94-1 retroactive to January 1, 1975, ERISA's 
original effective date. Nothing noteworthy is occurring in IB 94-1, the 
DOL thus suggests; IB 94-1 simply pronounces current law ab initio. 
To buttress its contention that IB 94-1 merely codifies existing fiduci-
ary standards for pension investments, the DOL cites a number of adminis-
trative rulings and prohibited transactions exemptions it has previously 
issued under ERISA. 7 
While the current leadership of the DOL characterizes ETis as optional 
for pension trustees, 8 that leadership has . signalled its strong support for 
4. See Employee Benefit Plan Security and Protection Act of 1994 (introduced by Congressmart 
James Saxton, H.R. 5135, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess.). This legislation would have prevented pension 
trustees from considering collateral benefits in making their investment decisions and thus would have 
effectively repealed 1B 94-1. See also The Pension Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 1594, which would 
nullify 1B 94-1 and proscribe the DOL from promoting ETls. 
5. The Secretary of Labor is authorized to promulgate regulations ''necessary or appropriate" to 
"carry out" ERISA's fiduciary provisions. See ERISA § 3(13) (defining the "Secretary" as the Secretary 
of Labor); § ~OS (authorizing the Secretary to promulgate regulations for Title I of ERISA which title 
includes ERISA's fiduciary provisions), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 1985). 
~- Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title I, § 2, 88 Stat. 832 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 1985)). 
1. See footnotes 2 through 7, inclusive, of the preamble to 1B 94-1. I discuss these administra-
tive rulings and prohibited transactions exemptions below. See infra notes 33 through 45 and accompa-
nying text . 
. · 8. Godfrey, supra note I (noting DOL Secretary Reich's characterization of ETis as optional for 
pension trustees). 
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such investments: IB 94-1 and the proposed clearinghouse constitute a 
forceful official imprimatur for ETis.9 
Ill 
THE UNSOUNDNESS OF THE ETI CONCEPT 
A. ET/sand Competitive Returns: An Inherent Paradox 
The ETI concept is unsound as a matter o:f policy and logic and is 
incompatible with ERISA's statutory standards governing pension trustees' 
investment decisions. 
Consider initially the DOL's definition of an ETI: an investment which 
carries a market rate of return, considering the associated risk, and which · 
produces collateral economic benefits. Since ETis yield competitive re-
turns, adjusting for risk, the pension fiduciary may, according to the DOL, 
consider ETis' supplementary advantages when making his investment 
choices without thereby violating ERISA's fiduciary standards. 
The DOL's definition of an ETI is designed to avoid the pitfalls of 
earlier, cruder approaches to social investing by pension plans. Some of the 
initial advocates of social investing considered the attainment of market re-
turns unimportant given the momentous causes for which they sought to use 
pension assets.10 In IB 94-1, the DOL disassociates itself from this more 
extreme approach. 11 
However, in doing so, the DOL creates a paradox for. itself: by defini-
tion, an investment yielding a market rate of return is an investment which 
the market will clear without special consideration of the investment's an-
cillary benefits. One need not believe that markets operate perfectly, in-
stantaneously or without cost to believe that reasonably competitive 
markets, over reasonable periods of time, will allocate capital to those ven-
tures which can plausibly be expected to yield prevailing rates of return. If, 
as IB 94-1 indicates, ETis generate competitive rates of return, there is no 
need for pension trustees or the DOL to extend particular solicitude toward 
those investments; they will be undertaken by someone because of normal 
market forces. 
9. See also statem.ent by Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich on Economically Targeted Investments 
by Six Pension Funds Working with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, USDL 
94-381 (August 2, 1994) (''This Administration wants to encourage fund managers to consider invest-
ments such as these that help their beneficiaries and help the economy overall.") (on file with author). 
10. See Targeted Pension Fund Investment: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 103d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (hereinafter Hearings) (testimony of Robert B. Reich, Secretary of Labor, DOL), 
( defining social investing as "subordinat[ing] financial return to some other social objective."). 
11. Id. ("ETis are frequently confused with what is known as 'social investing.' In current par-
lance, this term usually refers to investment practices that subordinate financial return to some other 
social objective. The Department of Labor does not condone the use of pension funds in this manner. 
We prohibit it. ETis are NOT social investing.") (capitalization in the original). 
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Instructive in this regard is the. pro-ETI testimony of Dr. William Dale 
Crist, president of the Board of Administration of the California Public Em-
ployees' Retirement System (CalPERS).12 Since CalPERS formally em-
braced an ETI policy in April of 1993, the fund has, pursuant to that policy, 
invested substantially in excess of a billion dollars of state pension monies 
in California real estate ("single family housing construction, affordable 
housing mortgages, residential acquisition and development financing and 
commercial mortgages"). 13 In addition, CalPERs has, under the aegis of its 
ETI policy, invested $200 million of a planned $500 million in "investment 
opportunities that are intended to stimulate the California economy."14 
CalPERS also intends to invest resources in "private equity placements 
[that] offer the best long-term opportunity to deploy capital for job-creating 
projects on a large scale" and in funds and businesses owned "by minori-
ties, women [and] California disabled veterans."15 All of these deploy-
ments of state pension monies, Dr. Crist insists, generate competitive, risk-
adjusted rates of return. 
If that is so, CalPERS has accomplished nothing by its ETI program: if 
these investments carry market rates of return, the regular operation of the 
market would have resulted in these investments being made. On the other 
hand, if the market was shunning these investments, that suggests that 
CalPERS is in reality embracing noncompetitive investments under the ae-
gis of its ETI program. 
Dr. Crist's optimistic analysis contrasts with Alicia H. Munnell's au-
thoritative study of state pension plans' efforts to encourage home owner-
ship through their investment portfolios. 16 Much of these efforts consisted 
of plan purchases of mortgage-backed securities .of the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA). Such purchases were justified as 
increasing local supplies of mortgage capital. After careful study, Dr. Mun-
nell concluded otherwise: 
The roughly $14 billion of GNMAs purchased by state-administered pen-· 
sion plans has provided the pension funds with market returns. However, 
the 'Catch-22' phenomenon generally ascribed to social investing by its op-
ponents seems applicable to this approach to supporting homeownership. 
Any housing investment that offers a competitive return at an appropriate 
level of risk, such as a GNMA, does not need special consideration from 
public pension plans nor will such consideration have any effect on the 
long-run supply of mortgage loans. On the other hand, investments by pen-
12. Hearing, supra note 10 (testimony of Dr. William Crist, president of the Board of Administra-
tion, CalPERS) (presented at the hearing at which the DOL unveiled 1B 94-1 ). See also Godfrey, supra 
note 1, at 1475. 
13. Id. 
· 14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Alicia H. Munnell, The Pitfalls of Social Investing: The Case of Public Pensions and Housing, 
NEW ENGLAND EcoN. REv. SeptJOct. 1983, at 20. 
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sion funds that will increase the supply of housing funds must by definition 
either produce lower returns or involve greater risk. 17 
Perhaps in anticipation of criticism along these lines, the DOL indi-
cates that markets for ETis are less active and less functional than the mar-
kets for other investments available to pension trustees. In particular, ETls 
"may be less liquid and may not have as much readily available information 
on their risks and returns"18 as other financial opportunities; ETis may re-: 
quire greater than normal sophistication on the investor's part. 19 Hence, 
ETis need particular solicitude. 
However, the association of ETls with inefficient markets compounds 
the paradox for ETI advocates. Efficient markets are necessary to ensure 
that returns are, as.claimed, competitive. When a pension trustee invests in 
a poorly-functioning market, there is limited discipline and, consequently, a 
distinct possibility that returns are in fact below prevailing levels. If the 
markets in which ETis are found are terribly :flawed, pension trustees can-
not be confident that such investments generate market rates of return. 
There is, moreover, no reason to associate supplemental advantages 
with imperfect markets. No doubt, some investment markets are not as ac-
tive and efficient as others; certain investments require more investor 
knowledge than others. But there is no reason to equate these problems 
with the DOL's notion of collateral economic benefits. Indeed, if there is. a 
correlation between collateral benefits and market imperfection, that corre-
lation is likely to be negative. ETis, as defined by the DOL, typically have 
important constituencies to merchandise them-i.e. the persons expecting 
to receive the investments' ancillary benefits. These constituencies have 
strong incentives to disseminate information about the investments from 
which they will profit. It is more likely that an ETI will be brought to 
pension trustees' attention with supporting information than will an other-
wise equivalent investment which lacks advocacy from a collateral benefit 
constituency. 
11. Id. at 36. 
18. See preamble to 1B 94-1. 
19. See also Crist, supra note 12 (If not for Ca!PERS, ETls "would have gone undiscovered in this 
very inefficient market".) 
In a similar vein, Professor Hylton argues that markets are often inefficient and, when they are, 
"socially responsible" investing criteria may help the investors using them beat the market. For exam-
ple, a corporation's good environmental record, she suggests, may be a proxy for sound (but presumably 
underappreciated) management. Maria O'Brien Hylton, 'Socially Responsible' Investing: Doing Good 
Versus Doing Well in. an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REv. I, 36 (1992). 
This is not persuasive. Assuming that markets are pervasively inefficient, there is no reason to 
believe that social investing standards are good surrogates for economic criteria. The most appropriate 
way to look for superior management is to look for it directly; managers may use exceptional environ-
mental performance to hide their weaknesses in other areas. 
See, e.g., Roberto Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 
93 CoLUM. L. REv. 795,829 (1993) (suggesting that South Africa-free investing was in practice invest-
ing in small capitalization stocks at times when such stocks underperformed). 
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Finally, if important instances of market failure exist, the more com-
pelling public policy is to correct that failure structurally rather than to in-
spire pension trustees to invest in flawed markets. Once market failure is 
remedied, the entire universe of investors is attracted to the market, not just 
pension trustees. 
In light of these considerations, the ETI clearinghouse is not merely an 
ambiguous notion but an incoherent one. If the clearinghouse is to be a 
marketplace for projects not now serviced by active markets, there is no 
reason to limit clearinghouse participation to pension plans: all investors 
with capital should be invited to partake of the new markets being estab-
lished. If, on the other hand, the ETI clearinghouse is envisioned as some-
thing other than a marketplace, it is less desirable than creating such a 
marketplace. 
To summarize: when markets are functioning properly, ETis do not 
need special investors interested in their· collateral benefits because, as de-
fined by the DOL, ETis carry rates of return adequate to attract capital 
under normal market criteria. Absent the discipline of reasonably efficient 
markets, pension trustees cannot be confident that proposed ETis carry 
competitive rates of return. When markets are not functioning properly, 
investors will not overlook systematically investments which yield ancillary 
benefits; those financial opportunities generating supplemental advantages 
are more, not less, likely to garner investment due to identification and pro-
motion by the groups anticipating those advantages. Finally, the appropri-
ate remedy for market failure is to correct the market. 
In a curious way the earlier doctrine of social investing was more co-
herent than the precept of economically targeted investing. Social investing 
largely eschewed concern for competitive returns on pension investments. 
While economically targeted investing purports to accept the importance of 
market-rate profits, it ignores the corollaries of such profits: that market 
forces will generally undertake investments generating competitive returns, 
and that, in the absence of properly-functioning markets, pension trustees 
cannot know with confidence that any particular investment does in fact 
generate market-rate earnings. 
B. Identifying Externalities 
The foregoing analysis, like 1B 94-1, assumes that collateral economic 
benefits can readily and objectively be identified, an assumption which, in 
many contexts, is highly questionable. The administrative letters and pro-
hibited transactions exemptions cited by the DOL as examples of ETis 
predominantly involve the building· trades and yield, as auxiliary benefits, 
employment for construction workers. When, however, we venture beyond 
these simple cases, the identification of collateral benefits becomes more 
subjective and problematic. Indeed, beyond these easy cases, the supple-
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mental advantages perceived in ETis can just as plausibly be found in more 
conventional investments and many proposals advanced by ETI proponents 
can reasonably be characterized as generating negative externalities. 
Take, for example, venture capital projects, cited by the DOL in its 
proposal for the ETI clearinghouse as a category of investments potentially 
yielding auxiliary economic benefits. There is much romance in this notion 
but no hard reason to conclude that new, start-up enterprises generate more 
positive externalities than less glamorous, more traditional deployments of 
pension capital. When a pension plan purchases the existing stock of an 
established publicly-held corporation, the seller of that stock relocates his 
capital somewhere else, possibly to the venture capital opportunity which 
was the pension plan's alternative investment choice. A strengthened price 
for its existing equity encourages the corporation to issue new stock for 
expansion with the attendant economic benefits of such expansion. A 
strengthened price for existing stock also increases the net worth of other 
holders of that stock which, in turn, encourages their consumption and 
investment. 
Consider another case the DOL cites as an ETI exemplar: affordable 
housing. Assuming we can agree what affordable housing is,20 it is difficult 
to specify collateral benefits generated by such housing which cannot also 
be found in other, more conventional investments. Affordable housing 
projects can generate construction jobs, but a pension plan also creates con-
struction jobs when it makes a conventional deposit in a savings bank 
which the bank then uses to make mortgages. Affordable housing develop-
ments help the persons who live in them; however, those persons also bene-
fit when a discount retailer offers consumer goods at lower prices or when 
the auto industry produces better and less expensive cars. 
Again, the CalPERS experience is instructive. CalPERS defines its 
ETis geographically, i.e., investments within the boundaries of,California.21 
At first blush, this seems reasonable as geography is a credible basis for 
determining the existence of collateral benefits: externalities are plausibly 
found when activities are located in proximity to one another. 
There are, however, negative effects to consider also: if other state 
pension plans emulate CalPERS and its geographic ETI policy, those states 
will similarly withdraw capital from other jurisdictions to invest at home; 
20. For example, Connecticut law defines affordable housing based on the income levels of the 
families living in the particular locality in which the housing is located, not on metropolitan-wide in-
come levels. Thus, a project in an affluent Connecticut suburb is deemed "affordable" notwithstanding 
rents beyond the reach of most families in the metropolitan area as long as the project is relatively 
inexpensive by the standiu-ds of the prosperous suburb in which the project is located. See CoNN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 8-39a (1958). It would be particularly ironic if the DOL's encouragement of ETis and 
affordable housing channels pension funds into the construction of housing too expensive for most 
Americans. 
21. See Hearing, supra note IO (testimony of Dr. William Crist, president of the Board of Admin-
istration, Ca!PERS). 
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some of this capital will be removed from California. The resulting balkan-
ization of the capital markets may on balance benefit California; however, 
California will just as likely lose capital in such an environment. At a mini-
mum, it is distinctly possible that California's geographical ETI policy, by 
encouraging other states to repatriate their pension investments too, will 
yield negative externalities for California, i.e., less net capital for California 
investments as the California economy loses pension monies from other 
states' plans. 
Moreover, such an ETI policy threatens unjustified underdiversifica-
tion22 for California pension plans as those plans withdraw their out-of-state 
capital and concentrate it locally.23 ETI advocates seem quite prone to per-
ceiving positive externalities in their proposals while overlooking such pro-
posals' negative spillovers.24 
In sum, if the concept of collateral benefit is broad enough to encom-
pass all the externalities conceivably generated by traditional investments, 
then the ETI category loses meaning because it includes the entire '1tllVerse 
of traditional investments. If, however, the concept of collateral benefit is 
to be more carefully demarcated, ETI advocates must distinguish between 
the benefits which ETis yield and the benefits just as plausibly found in 
conventional investments. ETI advocates must 'also confront the negative 
effects of their policies. IB 94-1 does not attempt these burdens. 
22. There are casc::s where a prudent fiduciary might reasonably sacrifice some diversification to 
further other legitimate objectives of his trust. For example, in recent years, trustees of many universi-
ties and colleges located in urban centers have quite sensibly invested portions of their endowments .in 
the neighborhoods bordering their campuses. While such investments tend to concentrate schools' port-
folios in communities in which the schools already have significant assets, i.e., the campuses them-
selves, such investments can stabilize the adjacent neighborhoods and thus make the campuses safer and 
more attractive places in which to learn, teach and research. In such instances, less geographical diversi-
fication is a price plausibly paid to furt~er the college or university's educational mission. On the 
growing tendency of colleges and universities in urban areas to invest in adjacent .neighborhoods, see 
Joseph N. Boyce, Campus Movement, WALL ST. J., Febrµary I, 1994, at Al. 
Similarly, a pension trustee owning real estate might reasonably conclude that externalities justify 
the acquisition of an adjoining parcel to maximize the value of the pension's portfolio. This would 
advance the pension's mission of providing retirement benefits even though acquiring the parcel makes 
the pension's portfolio less diversified spatially. 
In contrast, the geographic concentration caused by the Ca!PERS ETI program does not further the 
pension plari's basic duty, i.e., the provision of retirement benefits, but instead implements the pursuit of 
collateral economic benefits. In such a context, the decision to eschew diversification is much more 
troubling because that decision increases risk with no compensating advantage for the beneficiaries of 
the plan. 
23. As Judge Posner and Professor Langbein perceptively ask: "(S)uppose that a school board in 
the vicinity of Mount St. Helens had insisted on investh1g locally[?]" John H, Langbein and Richard A. 
Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 M1CH. L. REv. 72, 90 (1980). 
24. Consider, for example, the willingness of Connecticut treasurer Francisco L. Borges to over-
look the nature of the product manufactured by Colt's Manufacturing Company: guns. See infra note 
64, and accompanying text. 
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C. ET/s and ERISA 
Another burden IB 94-1 avoids is the relevant statutory language. ER-
ISA section 404(a)(l)(A)(i) requires pension fiduciaries to act "solely in the 
interest of the (plan's) participants and beneficiaries and ... for the exclu-
sive purpose of ... providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries 
.... " This provision replicates the historic "exclusive benefit" rule25 upon 
which the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") conditions pensions' tax-
qualified status;26 this ERISA provision also codifies the traditional require-
ment that fiduciaries act with undiminished loyalty towards their 
beneficiaries. 27 
In several administrative rulings cited by the DOL on behalf of IB 94-
1, the investments in question are construction projects and the collateral 
benefits at issue are jobs for plan participants. At first blush, it is a plausi-
ble interpretation of section 404(a)(l)(A)(i) that the "benefits" fiduciaries 
must provide include not only plan distributions but current economic bene-
fits as well, i.e., jobs. On a second look, however, James D. Hutchinson 
and Charles G. Cole persuasively argue that the "benefits" to which section 
404(a)(l)(A)(i) refers are retirement, disability and death payments and not 
pre-retirement economic advantages like employment.28 
However, IB 94-1 defines ETis even more broadly than this, as en-
compassing supplemental economic bounties for non-employee constituen-
cies, indeed for the economy as a whole. There is no warrant for this 
approach in the statute, which commands pension trustees to act solely and 
exclusively on behalf of participants and their beneficiaries. 
There is case law under the Code version of the exclusive benefit rule 
which permits pension assets in practice to yield "incidental" advantages to 
persons other than employees and their beneficiaries.29 If the exclusive 
25. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (flush language);§ 401(a)(2) (as amended) (1986). The exclusive benefit 
rule also appears in the pension provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. See Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c)(5) (West 1978 & Supp. 1995). 
26. Conventionally, the tax law's treatment of qualified plans is viewed as a tax expenditure. I 
disagree with this characterization, concluding that the Code's current approach to pension plans is 
consistent with normative tax principles. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: Quali-
fied Plans, Tax Expenditures, and the Flat, Plan Level Tax, 13 VA. TAX REv. 591 (1994). For purposes 
of the present discussion, it is not necessary to resolve this issue but merely to observe that the Code 
establishes an exclusive benefit rule for qualified plans. 
27. See generally JoHN H. LANGBEIN AND BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
LAW 610 (2nd ed. 1995). 
28. James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension 
Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 1340, 1370 (1980) ("Although the term 
'benefits' is arguably broad enough to encompass all of the rewards-moral and financial, direct and 
indirect-that a partidpant might reap from an investment program, the term is used more narrowly 
throughout the Act to refer to those cash benefits that a participant or his family would receive in 
accordance with the specifications of the plan."). 
29. See, e.g., Shelby U.S. Distributors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 874, 885 (1979) ("the in-
vestments of a trust may res11/t in some benefit to another person without the trust losing its exemption" 
under the Code's exclusive benefit rule) (emphasis added). Note that the Tax Court said that the third-
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benefit rule is to be applied by focusing upon the economic impact of pen-
sion investments (rather than upon the criteria utilized by pension trustees 
in their decisionmaking}, such an approach is a practical necessity: when a 
pension trustee sells or buys an asset, the other party to the exchange profits 
or he would not be transacting with the trustee. Unless such inevitable third 
party benefit is overlooked, the exclusive benefit rule would preclude pen-
sion trustees from undertaking any investments at all. Moreover, as Profes-
sors Langbein and Fischel point out in the context of defined benefit plans 
and the exclusive benefit rule, employers gain from their pensions' superior 
investment performance since such performance reduces the employers' 
funding obligations to their plans. 30 
It is, however, troubling to leap from the recognition that in practice 
pension investments unavoidably entail such incidental benefits to a whole-
hearted embrace of incidental economic benefits as legitimate criteria upon 
which pension trustees can base their investment choices. As a normative 
statement of the considerations pension trustees ought to contemplate in 
making their investment decisions, a single-minded concern for the welfare 
of participants and beneficiaries is both a compelling standard as a matter of 
policy and the standard embodied in the statute. -
Historically, the great challenge of fiduciary law has been to permit 
beneficiaries to profit from the skill, efficiencies and expertise of fiduciaries 
without permitting fiduciaries to abuse their positions of trust. The agency 
problems31 inherent in fiduciary relationships are exacerbated in the pen-
sion context both by beneficiaries' inability to act collectively32 and by the 
evidentiary difficulties of sorting out ex post the frequently complex finan-
cial transactions of large institutions. It was logical and appropriate for the 
drafters of ERISA to address these problems, inter alia, through fiduciary 
law's traditional duty of loyalty; the mandate that fiduciaries serve exclu-
sively the interests of their principals and not pursue ( or even contemplate) 
extraneous objectives. This very high standard of behavior is designed to 
deter pension trustees from even thinking about considerations other than 
participants' welfare; it also facilitates review of fiduciary decisionmaking: 
even minimal evidence that something other than participant welfare has 
party benefit may "result" from the trustee action, not that trustees may deliberately pursue such collat-
eral benefit. 
30. See generally Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ER/SA 's Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Cm. L. R:Ev. ll05 (1988). 
31. On agency problems more generally, see Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public 
Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions; 102 YALE L. J. 
ll65, 1173 (1993); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amend-
ment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. R:Ev. 1355, 1374 (1993). 
32. This inability stems from the costs and complications of beneficiaries banding together to 
protect their interests. When employees are unionized, the union's existence will sometimes solve their 
collective action problems for them. When, however, the union and its personnel are the difficulty 
rather than the sohition, employees in their capacities as pension participants will often find it difficult 
and costly to organize_ themselves to protect their pension interests. 
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motivated trustee behavior triggers the standard's protections. The exacting 
demands of the duty of loyalty thus insulate the fiduciary decisionmaking 
process from forces and factors with the potential of diverting that process 
from the welfare of the fiduciary's beneficiaries. 
Consider in this context the comments of Olena Berg, assistant secre-
tary for the DOL's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration and the 
administrator who actually promulgated IB 94-1: 
Nothing in BRISA prevents the making of[ETI] investments, provided 
that they meet the law's fiduciary requirements. Exist~g Department of 
Labor policies on economically targeted investments allow collateral bene-
fits to be considered in making investment decisions where such invest- . 
ments are prudent and provide a competitive risk-adjusted return. I want to 
reaffirm that it is appropriate for plan fiduciaries to make economically 
targeted investments consistent with ERISA's prudence and exclusive bene-
fit rules. 33 
Both logically and as a statutory matter, this statement is a muddle: In 
making their investment decisions, pension trustees can consider supple-
mental benefits to non-employee constituencies as long as the trustees com-
ply with the exclusive benefit rule. But, statutorily and logically, the 
exclusive benefit rule is just that, a rule which proscribes trustees from con-
sidering any factors other than the interests of plan participants and their 
beneficiaries so as to insulate the trustees from extraneous pressures and 
temptations. Rather than confronting the inconvenient language of the stat-
ute and the essential incoherence of her position, Secretary Berg contends 
that she is merely reaffirming the DOL's existing construction of the 
statute. 
However, a review of the administrative pronouncements invoked by 
the DOL on behalf of IB 94-1 belies any contention that IB 94-1 is the 
codification of well-established or convincing administrative precedent. 
In support of IB 94-1, the DOL summons seven exemptions34 it has 
issued under the prohibited transactions provisions of the Code and BR-
ISA. 35 However, citing these prohibited transactions exemptions ("PTEs") 
33. Olena Berg, A PW Exclusive: PWBA 's Diena Berg Discusses Agency's Future, 29 PENs10N 
WORLD No. 11, November, 1993, at 16. 
34. See the preamble to 1B 9~-1, n.3. In its public infonnation collection request to 0MB, the 
DOL again invoked its prohibited transactions exemptions as administrative precedent for the approval 
of ETls. See U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 3, at I of the supporting statement ("[T]he Depart-
ment has also granted a variety of prohibited transactions exemptions ... involving investments which 
produce collateral benefits."). 
35. These statutory provisions proscribe particular types of transactions (e.g., sales and exchanges) 
between plans and insiders positioned to abuse the assets of such plans (e.g., plan trustees, employers, 
family members of trustees and employers). Like much of the statutory framework goveffilng employee 
plans, there are parallel versions of the prohibited transactions rules in the Code and in the labor provi-
sions of ERISA. Administrative exemptions may be granted for specific transactions which would 
otherwise be precluded by statute. In 1978, President Carter delegated to. the DOL authority to issue 
such administrative exemptions on behalf of the IRS. 
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on behalf of IB 94-1 is, at best, unpersuasive and, at worst, disingenuous. 
The DOL issued each of the seven PTEs with the explicit caveat that the 
Department was not approving the exempted transaction under ERISA's 
fiduciary standards or under the Code's exclusive benefit rule but was only 
suspending the more limited operation of the prohibited transactions provi-
sions. For example, PTE 76-1,36 invoked by the DOL in support of IB 94-
1, states that its exemption does not extend to the exclusive benefit rule of 
ERISA section 404 or of Code section 401(a). Each of the other PTEs cited 
by the DOL in the preamble to IB 94-1 contains the same or a similar 
qualification, indicating that the exemption pertains only to the prohibited 
transactions provisions and not to the other fiduciary standards governing 
pension trusts.37 Hence, the seven PTEs do not support the proposition that 
ERISA section 404 permits pension trustees to consider collateral benefits. 
In support of its claim of prior administrative interpretation, the DOL 
also cites38 three official advisory opinions it has issued pursuant to ERISA 
Procedure 76-1,39 the Department's formal process for declaring its views 
on ERISA issues. Two of these three advisory opinions, 88-16A40 and 80-
33A 41 , pertain to the same practice, an agreement under which Chrysler and 
the UAW recommend to the institutional fiduciary of the Chrysler pension 
plans what are now being labelled ETis. However, for two reasons, 88-16A 
and 80-33A provide, at most, limited. support for IB 94-1 and its construc-
tion of ERISA section 404 as permitting pension trustees to consider collat-
eral economic benefits. First, the DOL carefully noted in its analysis of the 
Chrysler-UAW arrangement that the DOL condoned only the process of 
recommending ETis to the institutional fiduciary and that the DOL was not 
"expressing an opinion concerning whether specific transactions undertaken 
in accordance with the"42 Chrysler-UAW recommendations satisfy ER-
ISA's fiduciary standards. Second, in declaring that pension trustees must 
"ordinarily'' concern themselves with the retirement income interests of par-
For the text of the prohibited transactions rules, see I.R.C. § 4975 and ERISA § 406. For the 1978 
delegation to the DOL of responsibility for administrative exemptions, see§§ 102 and 105 of Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9814. For additional back-
ground on the prohibited transactions rules, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Pensions and Property 
Contributions: Wood, Keystone, and the Supreme Court, 56 TAX NoTEs 651, 652 (August 3, 1992); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Property Contributions to Qualified Plans: The DOL Threatens Established Tax 
Law, 62 TAX NoTES 753, 754 (February 7, 1994). 
36. 1976-1 C.B. 357, 41 Fed. Reg. 12740 (March 26, 1976), 1976 IRB Lexis 757. PTE 76-1 was 
issued jointly by the DOL and the IRS since it predated Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 which 
shifted to the DOL exclusive jurisdiction over prohibited transactions exemptions. See Zelinsky, Prop-
erty Contributions to Qualified Plans: The DOL Threatens Established Tax Law, supra note 35, at 
nn.19, 28. 
37. See, e.g., PTE 85-58, 50 Fed. Reg. 11272, cited in preamble to 1B 94-1, n.3. 
38. See preamble to 1B 94-1, nn. 2, 4, & 7. 
39. 41 Fed. Reg. 36281 (August 27, 1976). 
40. 1988 ERISA Lexis 16. 
41. 1980 ERISA Lexis 45. 
42. See DOL advisory opinion 88-16A, 1988 ERISA Lexis 16. 
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ticipants and beneficiaries, advisory opinion 88-16A provides no reasoning 
or authority for thus diluting the statutory mandate that trustees consider 
such interests "solely'' and "exclusively." 
Similarly, DOL advisory opinion 85-36A,43 cited in support of 1B 94-
1, concludes, without any authority or· reasoning, that participant welfare 
should "ordinarily"· guide fiduciary investment decisionmaking, and con-
spicuously disregards the statutory requirement that such welfare be the 
sole and exclusive concern in such decisionmaking. 
Finally, to support its claim that 1B 94-1 reflects prior administrative 
interpretation of BRISA section 404, the DOL invokes a number of private 
letters which it has issued.44 However, none of these was promulgated 
through the DOL's formal process for interpreting BRISA, BRISA proce-
dure 76-1.45 
Interestingly, the DOL ignores one relevant, albeit informal, declara-
tion of past policy, Ian D. Lanoff's statement on social investing made 
when he was administrator of the DOL's Office of Pension and Welfare 
Benefit Programs.46 That statement supports the contention that the DOL 
has in the past permitted pension fiduciaries to consider the incidental eco-
nomic benefits of proposed investments if such investments otherwise pass 
muster.47 On the other hand, a retrospective review of that statement and 
the context in which it was made point to a more complex conclusion, i.e., 
that, with the social investing movement gathering momentum, permitting 
pension trustees to consider otherwise acceptable investments' collateral 
benefits was a short-term stopgap adopted to protect for the long-run ER-
ISA' s fiduciary duties. 
When Mr. Lanoff served as the DOL's chief pension administrator, it 
was decidedly possible that ERISA's fiduciary provisions would die still-
born, overwhelmed by the growing social investing movement: at that 
time, many social investing advocates were calling for the deployment of 
pension funds to advance various political, social and economic causes 
without regard for BRISA and its exclusive benefit rule;48 many of these 
causes were politically popular and morally compelling; BRISA itself was 
in its infancy and not widely unaerstood; the courts had not yet created the 
body of case law which today reinforces BRISA' s requirements of prudence 
43. 1985 ERISA Lexis 8. 
44. See preamble to 1B 94-1, nn. 2 & 4-7. 
45. This is analogous to the IRS buttressing a claim of established administrative interpretation by 
citing private letter rulings. 
46. Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Law-
fully under ERISA? 31 LABOR L. J. 387 (July, 1980). This version of Mr. Lanoff's statement was 
derived from testimony he had previously given a subcommittee of the U.S. Senat.e. See id. at 389. 
47. See id. at 392. 
48. See, e.g., ROBERT B. RE1cH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 244 (1983) (stating that the 
"investment of a given proportion of pension fund assets in regional development banks" would help 
"spur the economy and thereby benefit American workers over the long term."). 
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and loyalty; an ERISA bar, conversant with those requirements and pos-
sessing an economic interest in enforcing them, had not yet developed. In 
this context, Mr. Lanoff quite accurately understood that the social invest-
ing movement threatened to "dilute the primary objective" of section 404 
before section 404 could be institutionalized.49 
Hence, the position crafted by Mr. Lanoff--incidental benefits may be 
considered if investments are otherwise satisfactory-while not totally con-
gruent with ERISA's exclusive benefit rule, was tactically astute in 1980 as 
an attempt to divert some of the pressure for social investing while preserv-
ing intact the core of ERISA's :fiduciary duties. 
Today, however, is not then. Many of the original advocates of social 
investing have over the years reexamined their posture.so ERISA's :fiduci-
ary norms have been strongly reinforced by the courts and by the DOL's 
enforcement efforts. In academic debate, the. center of gravity has shifted 
from discussion of social investing to the fiduciary protection of pension 
funds.st 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Lanoff position was a successful ef-
fort to buy time for the institutionalization of ERISA; an effort for which 
Mr. Lanoff deserves important credit. However, in 1995, we can see that 
that position, despite its valuable service in another time and another con-
text, is not true to the terminology of the pension statute or its underlying 
logic. 
In sum, the administrative precedent cited by the DOL for 1B 94-1 is 
slender. To the extent those pronouncements do support 1B 94-1, they can-
not be reconciled with the language of ERISA section 404 and they contain 
no authority or reasoning for disregarding the statute's requirement that par-
ticipant and beneficiary interests be the sole, exclusive criteria for :fiduciary 
decisionmaking. 
D. Defending IB 94-1 
Consider two final defenses of 1B 94-1: first, that 1B 94-1 does not 
primarily encourage ETis, but principally reaffirms the duties of prudence 
and loyalty;s2 second, that pension trustees, confronted with otherwise 
49. Lanoff, supra note 46, at 389. 
50. Compare Reich, supra note 48, with Reich, supra note 11. As I emphasize below, infra note 
72, I am not criticizing Secretary Reich for altering his opinions. My thinking on these issues has 
evolved and it is appropriate that his has also. On the other hand, the change in Secretary Reich's views 
underscores the difference between the. environment in which Mr. Lanoff promulgated his stance on 
social investing and the environment in which DOL issued IB 94-1 fourteen years later. Undoubtedly, 
the position adopted by Mr. Lanoffhelped significantly in getting us where we are today. That position, 
however, has now served its purpose. 
51. See, e.g., Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L. REv. 
631 (1994). 
52. See, e.g., Leon E. Irish, Misunderstanding Social Investing, 64 TAX NoTEs 966 (August 15, 
1994). 
348 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW [Vol. 16:333 
equivalent investment choices, ought be permitted to weigh collateral eco-
nomic benefits to break the tie. Pension trustees either must use some crite-
rion to select from among commensurate alternatives or must select from 
among such alternatives randomly; ETI-type benefits. are as good as any 
other possible tie-breaking criterion and are more seemly than random 
selection. 53 
Neither exoneration of m 94-1 is ultimately unconvincing. Pension 
trustees' obligations of prudence and loyalty do not need administrative 
confirmation; they are the core of ERISA's statutory scheme. Had m 94-1 
merely reiterated the·exclusive benefit rule, it would have been a nonevent, 
a redundant restatement of the statute. The DOL's subsequent advocacy of 
ETis leaves no doubt that m 94-1 and the ETI clearinghouse are intended 
to promote such investments. 54 
For three reasons, it is equally unpersuasive to defend m 94-1 as a tie-
breaking device. First, using collateral benefits to select from among 
equivalent investments perpetuates the illusion that ETI polices accomplish 
something. If investments genuinely yield competitive, risk-adjusted re-
turns-· -the sine qua non of being ETis-market forces will clear such in-
vestments without consideration of their collateral benefits. Using ETI 
considerations to break ties suggests otherwise and thus misleads plan par-
ticipants and others. 
Second, determining the presence of collateral benefits can be costly 
for .a pension plan. At a minimum, prudent plan trustees must spend their 
own time to divine and quantify the externalities allegedly flowing from 
particular investments. More typically, making such determinations re-
quires trustees to hire experts-economists, consultants, accountants, actua-
ries, investment bankers. There are, in contrast, no transactions costs to 
flipping a coin. 
Third, using ETI criteria to select from among equivalent investments 
introduces into pension trustees' decisionmaking inappropriate pressures to 
make such investments. If pension trustees use collateral benefits as a tie-
breaker, groups expecting to benefit from ETis have strong incentives to 
compel such trustees to declare ties. These are precisely the kinds of pres-
sures from which the exclusive benefit rule is intended to insulate pension 
fiduciaries. 
53. This line of thought was suggested to me by the comments of Alvin D. Lurie, Esq., who 
reviewed an earlier draft of this article. See also Alvin D. Lurie, ETls: To the Rescue or To Wreck You?, 
67 TAX NOTES 132 (April 3, I 995). 
54. See Reich, supra note 9. See also DOL Comments on Interpretive Bulletin Addressing ETls, 
Pension Plan Guide No. 1025 (CCH) 8 (1994) (paraphrasing Morton Klevan, DOL's Senior Director of 
Policy and Legislative Analysis: ''the DOL encourages ETls as a tool for economic revitalization''). 
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IV 
THE HAR.Ms OF IB-94-1: 
ETls AS PRIVATIZED INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Given the essential unsoundness of the ETI concept, it is tempting to 
dismiss that concept as destined for irrelevance. However, for three rea-
sons, the potential impact of IB 94-1 should not be underestimated. 
First, in specific cases, IB 94-1 and its approval of ETis will in prac-
tice alter the dynamics of fiduciary decisionmaking, inducing the deploy-
ment of pension assets away from conventional investments and toward 
ETls. Constituencies expecting to gain from particular ETis' collateral ben-
efits will be emboldened by the .DOL's formal support for their interests 
while trustees who previously resisted such investments find their positions 
correspondingly weakened. Thus, in particular cases, IB 94-1 will accom-
plish its intended mission, i.e., to shift patterns of fiduciary investment to-
wards ETls. 
Most susceptible to pressure from ETI advocates are public55 and 
multi-employer56 plans. Government pension plans are ultimately directed, 
in whole or in part, by elected officials who select the trustees for such 
plans or who serve as sucll trustees themselves. It requires little imagina-
tion to postulate situations in which elected officials will deploy public pen-
sion funds to satisfy ETI constituencies or will encourage their appointees 
to use pension resources to accommodate such constituencies. Officials in-
clined to resist the pressures of ETI proponents now find their opposition 
undercut by IB 94-1 and the DOL's approval of such investments.57 
The dynamics of multi-employer plans are similar. Union trustees face 
potential ETI demands from their members and from colleagues in the labor 
movement. IB 94-1 has removed the trump card of those multi-employer 
trustees tending to oppose such demands, i.e., the argument that ERISA's 
55. Technically; government plans are not subject to ERISA's fiduciary provisions and thus are 
not governed by 1B 94-1. See BRISA § 4(b){l). In practice, however, IB 94-1 will have significant 
influence on government pension plans. Most public plans are subject, by statute or case law, to local 
versions of the duty of loyalty; given the common origins and purposes of ERISA's exclusive benefit 
rule and the local law duty of loyalty, as well as the DOL's role as the nation's prime administrative 
interpreter of pension fiduciary law, IB 94-1 will influence the state law understanding of the duty of 
loyalty. · 
More generally, 1B 94-1 creates an atmosphere in which the nation's leading guardian of retirement 
funds approves pension plans' pursuit of collateral benefits. Such an atmosphere will embolden the 
constituencies seeking such benefits and demoralize those resisting ETis. 
See Debate Over Social Investment Policy Continues During Foundation Conference, 12 PEN. & 
BEN. R.Pra. (BNA) 1453 (Oct. 21, 1985) (citing remarks of Attorney Robert Klausner on the influence 
of federal pension law on states). 
56. For background on multi-employer plans, see LANGBEIN AND WoLK., supra note 27, at 57-61. 
57. For a comprehensive discussion of the pressures on public pension plans and their trustees, see 
Roberta Romano, supra note 19, at 795. 
350 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW [Vol. 16:333 
exclusive benefit rule and the DOL forbid consideration of collateral 
benefits. 58 
In the past, public and multi-employer plans have, as this analysis sug-
gests, demonstrated the most pronounced proclivities toward ETis because 
of their greater vulnerability to ETI constituencies;59 1B 94-1 is likely to 
strengthen those proclivities in the future. 
In contrast, private, single employer pension plans have, until now, 
shown little interest in ETis. 1B 94-1, however, will increase the ETI pres-
sures on such plans. Consider, for example, a corporation seeking govern-
ment approval or assistance ( e.g., a zoning exemption, tax-exempt 
financing). 1B 94-1 emboldens public officials to condition their consent 
upon the corporation's pension plan undertaking an ETI (e.g., an in-state 
investment sought by elected officials). In a similar fashion, 1B 94-1 en-
courages corporations with serious public relations problems ( e.g., tobacco 
companies) to deploy pension assets so as to portray themselves as respon-
sible corporate citizens.60 If, in practice, ETis carry competitive rates of 
return, the likely increase in ETI activity will be a charade which suggests 
to plan participants, shareholders, voters-indeed, virtually everyone with 
an interest in pension plans-that something is being accomplished when, 
in reality, market forces would have caused these investments to be made 
anyway. 
However, it is likely that many, if not most, investments labelled as 
ETis will in fact generate below-market returns. The proponents of 1B 94-1 
have already told us that ETis are often found in poorly functioning mar-
kets; this strongly suggests that proposed ETis will be declared economi-
cally competitive when there is no functioning market to test that 
declaration. Historical experience with ETis further counsels that, once the 
door is opened to consideration of collateral benefits, such concerns crowd 
out basic :financial criteria. 
Consider, for example, the investment of the Connecticut state pension 
fund in Colt's Manufacturing Company, a large gun manufacturer and a 
major employer in the Hartford area.61 When in 1990 Colt's fell on hard 
58. The management trustees of multi-employer plans might be expected to oppose ETis since 
investment losses can impact on employers. However, these trustees frequently face collective action 
problems hampering their effectiveness. The typical multi-employer plan involves many small busi-
nesses; a management trustee often limits his time and energy on the plan's affairs since only a small 
portion of his effort redounds to the advantage of his particular firm. Now that the DOL has placed its 
imprimatur on ETis, even less attention'to and resistance against such investments can be expected from 
these employer trustees. 
59. See generally Romano, supra note 19. 
60. If the DOL challenges these sorts of investments under the prohibited transactions rules as, 
e.g., ''transfer(s) ... for the benefit of" employers, the employers have a compelling retort: that their 
plans are deploying pension capital in the pursuit of collateral benefits per 18 94-1. · For background on 
the prohibited transactions rules, see supra note 35. · 
61. For background on the Colt's saga, see Kirk Johnson, Crying Betrayal in Hartford, Colt Faces 
Uncertain Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1993, at Al; John T. McQuiston, Colt Unit Sold, Connecticut 
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times, Connecticut treasurer62 Francisco L. Borges spearheaded a twenty-
five million dollar investment by the state pension fund in Colt's. Four 
years later, Colt's was again in bankruptcy with most of the fund's money 
lost.63 
Connecticut•s·experience demonstrates shows in a nutshell the dangers 
of economically targeted investing. While Borges clain.ed that the Colt's 
venture was financially sound and that job preservation was a secondary 
concern, it is hard to take that argument seriously. The more compelling 
characterization is that Connecticut state pension monies were used for an 
election year bail out of a failing firm and that basic economic criteria were 
discounted, if not ignored. 64 Connecticut's ETI experience is by no means 
atypical: 65 
Of course, investments selected without regard to collateral benefits 
can also go bad. Indeed, when pension plans maintain well-diversified 
portfolios, very lucrative investments are typically offset by losing. ones. 
However, ETI policies compound pensions' risk of loss by subjecting trust-
ees to pressures to subordinate financial concerns for the pursuit of collat-
eral benefits which, in a case like Colt's, cease to be collateral but in reality 
become the raison d'etre of the investment. 
The losses engendered by disregard of the exclusive benefit rule im-
pact most directly on participants in defined contribution plans. Poor in:.. 
vestment results diminish participants' accounts in such plans in 
comparison with the size such accounts would have achieved with better 
financial performance; losses actually reduce participants' defined contribu~ 
Among Buyers, N.Y. T1MEs, March 23, 1990, at Bl; Thomas Scheffey, A Horse Divided: The Colt's 
Bankruptcy Saga, CoNN. LAW TRIB., December 28, 1992, at 4. 
62. Connecticut elects its state treasurer; Mr. Borges successfully ran for re-election in 1990. 
63. The Connecticut pension fund invested $25 million in Colt's in 1990; in 1994, the fund recov-
ered $4.3 million in bankruptcy. 
While these numbers are dismal, they actually understate the loss sustained by Connecticut: the 
Connecticut Development Authority contributed $10 million to Colt's 1994 reorganization. Thus, in a 
important sense, the $4.3 million recovered by the pension fund merely came from Connecticut's tax-
payers thrciugh another state agency. See Colt's has reason to celebrate, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Octo-
ber 4, 1994, at Di 
64. Moreover, Borges and the other advocates of the Colt's investment never satisfactorily con-
fronted the negative extemality of that investment: Colt's makes and sells guns, a commodity of which 
many Connecticut cities already have a surfeit. 
There is evidence that Borges, the chief 11dvocate of Connecticut's ETI in Colt's, did more than 
overlook the nature of the products produced by Colt's. See Johnson, supra note 61 ("Having invested 
$25 million in Colt's on a pledge by the former State Treasurer, Francisco L. Borges, that Colt's did not 
make assault weapons, the legislature has now concluded that that is exactly what the company does."). 
Indeed, it appears that the Colt's investment is not the only unsuccessful ETI stemming from.Mr. 
Borges' stewardship of the Connecticut state pension funds. See Larry Williams, Building Value De-
clines; Goodwin Square Has Appraisal, HARTFORD CoURANT, April 6, 1995, at A3. 
65. See, e.g., James A. White, Back-Yard Investing Yields Big Losses, Roils Kansas Pension Sys-
tem, WALL ST. J., August 21, 1991, at Al (reporting on the losses of the Kansas Public Employees 
Retirement System from in-state ETis); LANGBEIN AND WOLK, supra note 27, at 777-778; Romano, 
supra note 19, at 803-811. 
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tion accounts and thus their retirement benefits. Hence, in this context, the 
incidence of below-market ETis falls straightforwardly upon participants 
and beneficiaries who receive smaller plan distributions than they otherwise 
would have. 
The repercussions of ETI policies are more complex-but equally un-
favorable-in the defined benefit setting. Since employers sponsoring de,. 
fined benefit arrangements commit to specified benefits, poor investment 
performance initially impacts on such employers, obligated in the face of 
such performance to contribute extra amounts to pay for the benefits the 
employers have promised. 
Nevertheless, in the defined benefit environment, participants do not 
necessarily escape the effects of inferior investments: employers sponsoring 
poorly-funded defined benefit plans are less likely and less able to agree to 
benefit increases than are employers whose plans are well-funded. When 
employers with fiscally sound plans augment benefits, individuals whose 
employers maintain inadequately financed plans either must migrate to 
other employers with fiscally secure plans or must accept less deferred 
compensation than · their counterparts working in these other firms. This 
choice will be particularly costly for individuals with firm-specific skills 
and entitlements, forced to abandon these skills and entitlements to obtain 
prevailing levels of deferred compensation. 66 
In particularly dire cases, financially weak employers sponsoring un-
derfunded defined benefit plans default on the benefits they have promised. 
In some such cases, employees receive redress from the employer's assets 
in bankruptcy or from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), 
the government-sponsored insurance program for basic pension benefits. 
However, if the employer is not subject to PBGC coverage or if an em-
ployee's accrued benefits exceed the minimum level guaranteed by the 
PBGC; underfunding combined with employer default results in the em-
ployee losing some or all of the pension benefit he had earned. 
Even if employers fully absorb the impact of below-market ETI invest-
ments, the implications of such investments are troubling. In the case of 
publicly-sponsored plans, poor investment performance is a form of hidden 
taxation: Connecticut's taxpayers must replenish the state'.s pension fund 
for the cost of the Colt's fiasco. In the case of private plans, noncompeti-
tive ETI projects diminish shareholder welfare when such projects compel 
the employer to compensate the defined benefit plan for its poor financial 
performance. 
A second reason for taking 1B 94-1 seriously is that, in the long run, 
we can anticipate ETI proponents to press for mandatory ETI requirements. 
66. For a discussion of firm-specific skills and entitlements and their impairment of employees' 
mobility, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Albertson's: Why Courts Shouldn 't Override Clear Statutory Lan-
guage, 66 TAX NOTES 1691, 1697 (March 13, 1995). 
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To date, the current leadership of the DOL has characterized ETis as op-
tional for pension trustees.67 However, the underlying logic of IB 94-1 
points in a different direction: if ETis produce significant collateral benefits 
while traditional investments do not, it is socially inefficient for pensions to 
make traditional investments when.ETis earn the same risk-adjusted rate of 
return while also generating positive externalities. Thus, IB 94-1 is proba-
bly not the final position of ETI advocates but rather an initial foothold on 
the path to mandatory ETis. 
Finally, perhaps the most significant aspect of IB 94-1 is that it rein-
carnates the doctrine of industrial policy and thus reflects the appeal of that 
discredited doctrine to those interested in off-budget activism. During the 
early 1980s, several influential commentators advanced the notion of indus-
trial policy as an antidote to the economic strategies of the Reagan adminis-
tration. Chief among the advocates of industrial policy was the current 
Secretary of Labor and ETI proponent, Robert Reich. 
The most distinctive premise of the industrial policy program was that 
government should "guide and accelerate market forces."68 Thus, Secretary 
Reich stated, ''the government's role in industry" should be "more open, 
more explicit, and more strategic."69 In practical terms, this vision was to 
be implemented through such devices as government banks, "provid[ing] 
low-interest long-term loans to industries that agree to restructure them-
selves to become more competitive."70 In this vision, capital is to be allo-
cated not merely in response to market signals; rather, government is to 
oversee the operations of industry and the deployment of capital.71 
·Most proponents of industrial policy, including Secretary Reich,72 now 
claim that their thinking has progressed beyond the industrial policy pro-
61. See generally supra note 8. 
68. See Reich, supra. note 48, at 278. See also Charles Wolf, Jr., The New Mercantilism, THE 
PuBuc INTEREST No. 116, Summer, 1994 at 96, 97-98 ("fundamental premise" of industrial policy is 
that "government should select certain industries, technologies, and firms whose advancement is of 
'critical' importance for the economy as a whole, and accord the selected ones some form of preferential 
treatment-whether through subsidies, tax advantages, import restrictions, special efforts to promote 
exports, or direct government financing for 'precommercial development' of putatively critical technolo-
gies.'' In this vision, government should encourage those industries generating "spillover benefits ['ex-
ternalities'] that are presumed to accrue to other industries or to the economy as a whole."). 
69. Id. at 14. 
· 70. Id. at.243. 
71. This, Secretary Reich assured us, did not imply ''national planning, in which bureaucrats-
ignorant of or indifferent to market forces-shift capital from industry to industry to nurture their favor-
ite 'winners.' " Instead, the call was for "well-designed adjustment policies-through which govern-
ment seeks to promote market forces rather than to supplement them .... " Id. at 234 (emphasis in 
original). 
72. In making these observations, I do not intend to criticize Secretary Reich for altering his views 
over time. My own thoughts in this area have changed over the years, and I hope this is viewed as 
manifesting further reflection and experience. 
On the other hand, the continuities between 1B 94-1 and Secretary Reich's earlier views on indus-
trial policy are striking. 
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gram. However, the similarities between that program and IB 94-1 are too 
great to be accidental. IB 94-1 represents the second life of industrial pol-
icy, conceived this time as a privatized enterprise: pension trustees are to 
fill the role previously assigned to government, guiding the society's alloca-
tion of capital with an acumen surpassing the wisdom of the market 
Industrial policy conducted by pension fiduciaries will suffer from 
many of the same deficiencies as industrial policy implemented directly by 
the government: There is no reason to believe pension trustees searching 
for collateral benefits can allocate capital more wisely, efficiently or far-
sightedly than can markets and traditional market criteria. Mixing the al-
ready complex mission of the pension system-providing retirement 
benefits to employees-with the task of overseeing the market's allocation 
of capital will lead to a confusion of roles and, consequently, poor perform-
ance of both assignments. The constituencies most likely to promote ETis 
are those groups losing in the competition of the market; ETis will thus be 
used to bail out failing industries and to satisfy constituencies promoting 
below-market investments. 
Particularly troubling are the possibilities of a mandatory ETI regime. 
It is only a short step from the federal government requiring that plans make 
ETis to the federal government specifying which ETis plans must make. 
Thus, the privatized version of industrial policy embodied in IB 94-1 could 
prove an initial step towards a more robust rendition in which the federal 
government, via control of the portfolios of pension plans, dominates the 
allocation of society's capital.73 
Ultimately, IB 94-1, and its resurrection of industrial policy, is a mani-
festation of off-budget activism in an era when many policy makers per-
ceive political and economic constraints as precluding more direct and open 
forms of governmental activity. IB 94-1 is thus part of a more general 
proclivity74 to eschew explicit taxation and expenditures in favor of implicit 
forms of taxation and spending. Hence, IB 94-1 is, in the last analysis, not 
simply a problem of the pension community, but of all concerned that pub-
lic policy be implemented with maximum directness and accountability. 
For my previous statement on the issues addressed here, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Dilemma of 
the Local Social Investment: An Essay on 'Socially Responsible' Investing, 6 CARDOZO LAW REv. 111 
(1984). I earnestly implore the reader to leave this article unread. 
73. If the ETI concept as articulated in 1B 94-1 were fundamentally sound, it might be worthwhile 
to incur the risk that this scenario will come to pass. However, given the incoherence oflB 94-1, there 
is no reason to hazard this possibility. 
74. Perhaps the most well-known manifestation of off-budget activism is the profusion of un-
funded mandates imposed by the federal and state governments. See generally Zelinsky, VAND. L. 
REv., supra, note 31. For other manifestations of this trend, see generally REGULATION (William A. 
Niskanen ed., December 1994) (not yet released). 




While the DOL portrays 1B 94-1 and its codification of the ETI con-
cept as a routine confirmation of existing law, 1B 94-1 is in fact an impor-
tant and unfortunate development. m 94-1 is illogical, unsound and 
inconsistent with the provisions of ERISA governing pension trustees' in-
vestment decisions. In its first incarnation, industrial policy came to be 
repudiated by even its originators; industrial policy does not deserve a sec-
ond life in the form of the ETI. The DOL should withdraw 1B 94-1 or 
Congress should repeal it. 
